Towards a metric for recognition-based graphical password security by English, R. & Poet, R.
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
English, R. and Poet, R. (2011) Towards a metric for recognition-based 
graphical password security. In: 5th International Conference on Network 
and System Security (NSS), 6-8 Sep 2011, Milan, Italy. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/71250 
 
Deposited on: 22 November 2012 
 
 
Towards a Metric for Recognition-Based Graphical
Password Security
Rosanne English
School of Computing Science
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, Scotland
Email: rose@dcs.gla.ac.uk
Ron Poet
School of Computing Science
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, Scotland
Email: ron@dcs.gla.ac.uk
Abstract—Recognition-based graphical password (RBGP)
schemes are not easily compared in terms of security. Current
research uses many different measures which results in confusion
as to whether RBGP schemes are secure against guessing and
capture attacks. If it were possible to measure all RBGP schemes
in a common way it would provide an easy comparison between
them, allowing selection of the most secure design. This paper
presents a discussion of potential attacks against recognition-
based graphical password (RBGP) authentication schemes. As a
result of this examination a preliminary measure of the security
of a recognition-based scheme is presented. The security measure
is a 4-tuple based on distractor selection, shoulder surfing,
intersection and replay attacks. It is aimed to be an initial
proposal and is designed in a way which is extensible and
adjustable as further research in the area develops. Finally, an
example is provided by application to the PassFaces scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Password authentication is failing as an authentication
mechanism due to lack of memorability and security [1], [10]
and graphical passwords are presented as an alternative [3],
[7]. In particular, with a recognition-based graphical password
(RBGP) user authentication scheme the user provides a user-
name and selects (or is provided with) a number of “pas-
simages” (term by [5]). Upon commencing the authentication
process, the user provides their username and is presented with
a challenge screen which contains one of their passimages
along with a selection of alternative images called distractors.
To successfully authenticate the user must recognise and select
their passimages from the distractor images for a number
of challenge screens. Whilst the potential memorability and
usability of such schemes have been examined [6], [14] ,
analysis of their security is often limited to countermeasures
for a specific attack. As such, it is unclear whether RBGP
schemes provide a secure alternative to passwords. There
remains no standardised method of measuring the level of
security of a RBGP scheme. The contribution of this work is to
combine literature on the security of RBGP schemes in a way
which results in an extensible 4-tuple evaluation of the security
of RBGP schemes. In the remainder of this paper we present
a threat model for RBGP schemes, examine counter measures
and propose a heuristic approach to evaluating security levels
for RBGP schemes. The result follows that different RBGP
schemes can be compared in a common manner.
II. THREAT MODEL
Here we present a threat model for RBGP schemes, where
the aim of the attacker is to obtain a users passimages
and username. The threat model does not consider possible
software exploits since such exploits would be very specific
to an implementation and it would not be possible to generalise
these for application to all RBGP schemes.
As categorised by DeAngeli et al. [6] the main attacks
can be split into three distinct areas of concern; guessability,
observability and recordability. Literature on RBGP schemes
was examined and attacks were identified and categorised into
the three areas. In addition to this, one further attack was iden-
tified by examination of the dictionary attack threat relevant
to password authentication schemes. The following attacks
were identified from literature and are considered in our threat
model (as shown in Figure 1): shoulder surfing, intersection
attacks, eavesdropping resulting in a replay attack, phishing
and social engineering tactics for guessing. The remaining
attack, ordered guessing, was identified by comparison with
dictionary attacks and is also included in our threat model.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to construct a heuristic model for evaluating the
security of RBGP we take the following approach.
1) Examine the relevant literature and extract the possible
counter measures to the specific attacks presented in the
threat model.
2) Abstract these counter measures from specific imple-
mentations to general approaches.
3) Construct a series of key questions for each attack
4) Construct flow charts which combine the key questions
for each attack. Questions regarding the set up of a
RBGP scheme will be asked and if counter measures
which result in a more secure scheme against that spe-
cific attack are implemented, then the security measure
will be increased. Where no counter measures or an
otherwise insecure setup is used, the level of security
for that scheme will be reduced.
Each area of concern and related attacks from our threat
model shown in Figure 1 are discussed in the remainder of this
section which covers points 1 to 3 for each potential attack
(where possible).
Fig. 1. Threat Model
A. Guessability: User Specific - Social Engineering Tactics
Social engineering is the process of exploiting information
about or provided by users in order to attack a system [15].
It exploits users in a non-technical approach. An educated
guess approach is highlighted in [11] where they use an
oil filter applied to images to avoid such attacks. As the
authors highlight in their future work section, an experiment
to examine the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure
is yet to be reported. Another approach which removes the
guessability issue completely is to assign images to a user,
this means their choice cannot be exploited for an attack.
However, this could interfere with memorability. Overall, this
area requires further research. In particular experiments should
be conducted to determine how easily images are guessed. This
is proposed in the future work section.
B. Guessability: User Generic - Ordered Guessing Attacks
When considering alphanumerical passwords, an offline
dictionary attack is common and involves constructing a list
of words and trying each member of the list until a matching
password is found [4]. In the context of an offline dictionary
attack for recognition-based graphical password scheme, this
type of attack appears infeasible since the passimage is known
to be on the screen and trying all possibilities until a matching
image is found is not applicable in this instance. It follows that
a traditional offline dictionary attack would not be applicable
to a recognition-based scheme. However, we propose that there
is a possibility for an online guessing attack which prioritises
more commonly selected images.
We have conducted studies into exploring the feasibility
of these “prioritised guessing attacks”, in which the attacker
selects the “most probable” image given the challenge screen
presented with the purpose of increasing the probability of
selecting the correct image. This was conducted by collecting
a graphical passimage set of four images for 64 users. Each
image belonged to one of twelve distinct categories. The num-
ber of selections in each category and ordering the categories
from most to least probable. An attack was then launched by
constructing a challenge screen for each possible passimage
and choosing the image from most likely category given the
ordering noted. It became apparent that bias in user choice
Fig. 2. Distractor Selection Flowchart
could decrease the estimated guessability by varying degrees
dependent on how distractors are selected for a given challenge
screen. On average, guessing using a prioritised attack was
13 times more likely to succeed than random guessing for a
passimages scheme. For more information on the details of
this study, please see [9].
The evaluation of distractor selection is presented in Figure
2, a flow chart which combines a number of questions relating
to the set up of a RBGP scheme which coincide with the
results of the research determining how these answers affect
security against a prioritised guessing attack. If users are not
allowed to select their own images, no bias can be exploited
in a guessing attack (assuming random assignment of passim-
ages) and in this case the security measure is increased by one.
If users can select their own images from a collection which
cannot be categorised into semantic categories, then there is
insufficient information to analyse potential security impact.
In this case no adjustment is made to the security measure.
If users select their own images from a collection which
can be categorised into distinct semantic categories and the
distractors are selected entirely randomly, then guessability can
be decreased by construction of a semantic ordered guessing
attack and the measure is reduced by one to reflect this. If
distractors are selected from distinct categories other than the
category of the passimage, guessability can be decreased by
construction of a semantic ordered guessing attack and the
measure is reduced by two to reflect this. If however the
distractors are not selected from distinct categories, then the
reduction is less and the security level is reduced by only one.
C. Observability:Shoulder Surfing
In [17], the authors propose that counter measures for a
shoulder surfing attack can be placed under two categories;
using no indicators of passimage selection or disguising indi-
cators of passimage selection . We extend this categorisation
by inclusion of an additional approach taken by DeAngeli et
al. [6] and Dunphy et al. [8]. In this approach, a “key image
portfolio” concept for security against observation attacks is
used where the user selects a number of passimages which
exceeds the number of challenge screens presented. This
means that in any authentication session, a subset of the users
passimages are presented.
There are a number of specific counter measures for shoul-
der surfing. An example of a scheme where no indicators are
shown include the work in [18] where a convex-hull approach
is taken. In this approach the user is required to click any point
in a convex-hull which is created from mentally joining the
users passimages shown on screen. An example of a scheme
were image selection is disguised is presented in [11] where
passimages have an oil painting filter applied to disguise the
image .
We now highlight several key issues when considering
construction of a RBGP scheme which is resistant to shoulder
surfing. If the scheme does not provide any indication of
a passimage being selected (e.g. by border, or highlighting)
then the scheme is very secure against shoulder surfing and
the security metric can be increased to reflect this. If there
is an indication of which image has been selected, but this
has been disguised then the scheme is similarly secure. If
however there is no attempt to disguise image selection but
the scheme implements a “key image portfolio” as in [6] and
[8] then the scheme reduces potential for shoulder-surfing, but
does not eliminate it completely and hence the metric can be
incremented, but not by the same value as being completely
secure against shoulder surfing.
If there is an indication of the image selected, with no at-
tempt to disguise this selection and no implementation of a key
image portfolio, then the scheme is almost definitely insecure
against shoulder surfing and the measure is decremented to
reflect this. These results are summarised and combined into
the flowchart shown in Figure 3.
D. Observability: Intersection Attack
An intersection attack, as defined by Dhamija et al. [7]
(and discussed in [8], [13] ) is an attack in which the at-
Fig. 3. Shoulder Surfing Flowchart
Fig. 4. Intersection Attack Flowchart
tacker records multiple challenge screens and notes the images
which occur with high frequency. The authors successfully
summarise general approaches to counter measures for this
issue as:
• Use the same decoy images and pass images for each
session.
• Use a small subset of decoy images for each session.
• Present a number of challenge screens which, if a user
fails at one stage, subsequent screens only display distrac-
tor images. This means an attacker cannot impersonate
a user in order to discover their complete set of pass
pictures.
• Implement a limit on the number of incorrect authen-
tications a user can perform, this stops an impersonator
attempting to discover all of the images. (A “three strikes
and you’re out” approach)
Maintaining the same distractors for a given passimage
does ensure that an intersection attack is not possible. The
remaining three options only serve to minimise the potential
for an intersection attack.
Figure 4 shows the flow chart for this attack. Where the
same distractor images are used for a given passimage the
security is increased as this stops a possible intersection
attack. Where one of the remaining mitigation techniques are
implemented, no adjustment to the level of security is made
since the possibility of an intersection attack is still present,
even though this risk is reduced. If no attempt is made to
mitigate or stop an intersection attack, the level of security is
reduced.
E. Recordability: Eavesdropping resulting in a Replay Attack
Application of a replay attack to a recognition-based graph-
ical authentication scheme is similar to considering a replay
attack on an alphanumerical password scheme. A man-in-
the-middle attack is constructed and the data copied when
a user performs the authentication process and sends the
authentication data to the server. The data is then “replayed”
to the server at another time, potentially resulting in a false
positive authentication. Discussion of this type of attack in
terms of RBGP schemes is limited. Ku et al. [12] implement a
remote user authentication protocol which sends a hash based
on the time stamp (essentially performing as a salt value),
code from the passimage (in this case a drawing) and other
components. However, Ku’s work is based on the Draw a
Secret scheme and not on a RBGP scheme.
In addition to this approach of mitigating a replay attack,
we propose a random assignment of location of the passimage
on the challenge screen presented to the user, it should be this
position which is sent back to the server to authenticate.
The key aspect of both these approaches is sending a dif-
ferent value each time authentication occurs, which results in
avoiding a replay attack. This is incorporated into a flowchart
presented in Figure 5 . If the communication between client
and server sends the pass image identifier then security is
reduced, if this is not the case but a different value is sent
each time the security level is increased. In the final option, the
passimage identifier is not sent, but it is the same value each
time results in a value which may be traceable to the image and
so the security level is reduced. With careful design, a replay
attack can be completely avoided. However, not all aspects of
the design are mentioned when new schemes are proposed and
thus the assumption has been made that a replay attack may
not have been considered when designing a scheme.
F. Recordability: Phishing
As noted by Biddle et. al in [2], a phishing attack is
relatively easily applied to a RBGP scheme. In this situation,
the attack would be carried out in real time. A man-in-the-
middle attack would be performed, and the user’s username
is sent to the attacker who then uses this in the legitimate
Fig. 5. Replay Attack Flowchart
site to obtain a valid challenge screen, which is relayed
back to the subject of the attack. The process is repeated
until authentication has completed. At the moment, there is
insufficient research to produce a method which takes onus
off the user (since users appear not to take notice of security
indicators such as the use of SSL [16]) and thus the best
recommendation currently is to implement SSL and hope the
user takes notice.
IV. HEURISTIC MODEL FOR SECURITY EVALUATION
The main result of this paper is the heuristic model for se-
curity evaluation, this model arose from the flowcharts shown
in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 which covered ordered guessing,
shoulder surfing, intersection and replay attacks. Each factor
(distractor selection, shoulder surfing, intersection and replay)
provides one score of a 4-tuple, where the score starts at 0 and
increases or decreases depending on the route taken through
the corresponding flow chart. The resulting tuple represents
the security of a RBGP scheme in terms of these aspects,
that is {distractor score, shoulder surfing score, intersection
score, replay score}. For example a scheme which is the most
insecure in terms of the model presented would have a 4-tuple
of {-2,-1,-1,-1} whilst the most secure setup would result in
a 4-tuple of {1,2,1,1}.
In general, where secure set up is implemented scores are in-
creased by one, where no countermeasures were implemented
scores were decremented by one. In shoulder surfing (Figure
3), there is the possibility to increase the level of security by
two scales. This is due to the perceived significance (identified
by the quantity of research in this area) of the threat caused
by shoulder surfing and also due to the graded levels of
counter measures available as described in Section III-C. In
addition, there are two instances where no adjustment to the
security level is possible. The first case is in distractor selection
for an ordered guessing attack (shown in Figure 2), where
a non-random distractor selection algorithm is implemented.
In this case it is not possible to determine how successful
an ordered guessing attack might be without further analysis.
The second instance is when considering intersection attacks,
where counter measures which mitigate (but do not remove
the possibility of) intersection attacks. The model is designed
in such a way that it is extensible. This means that once
further research is conducted, the results can be incorporated
to the initial framework providing a more complete measure
of security levels for RBGP schemes.
V. EXAMPLE - APPLICATION TO PASSFACES SCHEME
In order to provide a concrete example, the PassFaces
scheme (www.realuser.com) was examined. From review-
ing the white paper available at http://www.realuser.com/
published/TheScienceBehindPassfaces.pdf the following infor-
mation on the setup of the scheme was extracted:
• in general, four passfaces are assigned to a user and
to authenticate users must identify their passfaces from
four challenge screens each showing a passface and eight
decoy faces
• order of faces on the screen is random
• no grid contains faces from the other grids and these faces
are similar in appearance to the passface so that no one
face stands out
• the same decoys are used each time for a given passface
• the option is provided to use keypad entry of the passface
• a “mask” is applied to the faces after selection
From this information it was possible to rule out guessing
attacks completely due to the random assignment of passfaces,
which gives a secure guessability factor of 1. It was not
possible to consider eavesdropping or phishing attacks, nor
was it possible to consider replay attacks. However, there
was sufficient information to examine shoulder surfing and
intersection attacks. In terms of shoulder surfing the mask ap-
plication after selection meant image selection was disguised,
resulting in a shoulder surfing security factor of 2. If there
was no masking, the alternate keypad entry would result in
a shoulder surfing factor of 1, but the highest of the two
possibilities was considered appropriate. Since the scheme
provides the same decoys (or distractors) for a passface for
a given user, the scheme has an intersection security factor
of 1. This results in a security 4-tuple of {1,2,1,X} where X
represents the unknown resistance to replay attacks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The work presented here represents a step towards providing
a unified measure of the security of RBGP schemes. The ap-
proach taken analysed potential attacks and counter measures
and as a result constructed a series of key questions in order
to determine resistance to these attacks. The attacks included
were ordered/prioritised guessing,shoulder surfing, intersection
attacks, and replay attacks. Analysis of each aspect resulted in
a flow chart which provided one score of a 4-tuple. The score
for each factor starts at 0 and increases or decreases depending
on the route taken through the corresponding flow chart.The
resulting tuple represents the security of a RBGP scheme in
terms of these factors. The area requires further research, in
particular research is proposed in the areas of social engineer-
ing for a known user where users select personal images for
their passimages. The problem of recording a passimage (using
a camera or screenshot) also needs to be addressed. The model
presented is extensible to include further work as this would
add extra flowcharts for any additional attacks analysis which
can be added to the evaluation and also additional information
can be added for any given attack already summarised.
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